Security fix

This commit is contained in:
2026-11-08 16:20:23 +01:00
parent 93fc177911
commit 311c4053f0
15 changed files with 281 additions and 50 deletions
+23 -4
View File
@@ -95,6 +95,13 @@ def init_db():
def save_to_sqlite(client_id, data, protocol="DMR"):
conn = sqlite3.connect(DB_PATH, timeout=10)
try:
_save_to_sqlite(conn, client_id, data, protocol)
finally:
conn.close()
notify_update('log_aggiornato')
def _save_to_sqlite(conn, client_id, data, protocol):
c = conn.cursor()
rssi_val = 0
@@ -110,8 +117,6 @@ def save_to_sqlite(client_id, data, protocol="DMR"):
data.get('slot', 0), round(data.get('duration', 0), 1), round(data.get('ber', 0), 2),
str(data.get('src_ext', '')), rssi_val, str(data.get('source', '')), str(data.get('mode', ''))))
conn.commit()
conn.close()
notify_update('log_aggiornato')
def audit(username, client_id, command):
try:
@@ -133,9 +138,23 @@ def prune_old_data():
n1 = c.rowcount
c.execute("DELETE FROM audit_logs WHERE timestamp < datetime('now', 'localtime', ?)", (f"-{audit_days} days",))
n2 = c.rowcount
# Telemetria e backup config non venivano mai potati (default generosi, configurabili)
tele_days = int(cfg.get("telemetry_retention_days", 90))
n3 = 0
if tele_days > 0:
c.execute("DELETE FROM telemetry_logs WHERE timestamp < datetime('now', 'localtime', ?)", (f"-{tele_days} days",))
n3 = c.rowcount
keep = int(cfg.get("config_backups_keep", 100))
n4 = 0
if keep > 0:
c.execute("""DELETE FROM config_backups WHERE id NOT IN (
SELECT id FROM config_backups b
WHERE b.client_id = config_backups.client_id AND b.service = config_backups.service
ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT ?)""", (keep,))
n4 = c.rowcount
conn.commit()
if n1 or n2:
logger.info(f"🧹 Pulizia DB: {n1} ascolti e {n2} audit rimossi.")
if n1 or n2 or n3 or n4:
logger.info(f"🧹 Pulizia DB: {n1} ascolti, {n2} audit, {n3} telemetrie e {n4} backup config rimossi.")
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"❌ Errore pulizia DB: {e}")
+10
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
"""Controllo permessi sui nodi, condiviso da API, push e WebSocket (nessuna dipendenza interna)."""
def node_allowed(role, allowed_nodes, cid):
if role == 'admin':
return True
allowed = (allowed_nodes or '').strip().lower()
if allowed == 'all':
return True
return cid in [x.strip().lower() for x in allowed.split(',') if x.strip()]
+30
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import sqlite3
from contextlib import closing
from flask_socketio import SocketIO
from core.config import CACHE_FILE, DB_PATH, DMR_IDS_PATH, NXDN_IDS_PATH, logger, web_cfg
from core.permissions import node_allowed
# --- WEBSOCKET SOCKETIO ---
socketio = SocketIO(cors_allowed_origins=web_cfg.get('cors_origins', '*'))
@@ -51,6 +52,35 @@ operating_modes = {}
node_logs = {} # In-memory circular buffer for live logs
connected_web_clients = set()
active_logged_users = {}
socket_auth = {} # sid -> {"username","role","allowed_nodes","ts"} (solo socket con sessione valida)
auth_lookup = None # impostato da app.py: username -> dict auth aggiornato oppure None
AUTH_REFRESH_SEC = 120
def emit_to_authorized(event, data, cid=None):
"""Invia l'evento solo ai socket autenticati (e, se cid e' dato, autorizzati su quel nodo)."""
now = time.time()
for sid, a in list(socket_auth.items()):
try:
# Rilegge periodicamente ruolo/nodi: utenti rimossi o declassati perdono l'accesso live
if auth_lookup and now - a.get('ts', 0) > AUTH_REFRESH_SEC:
fresh = auth_lookup(a['username'])
if not fresh:
socket_auth.pop(sid, None)
continue
a.update(fresh)
a['ts'] = now
if cid is None or node_allowed(a.get('role'), a.get('allowed_nodes'), cid):
socketio.emit(event, data, to=sid)
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"emit_to_authorized '{event}': {e}")
def emit_aprs(data):
"""APRS live: broadcast come prima, oppure solo utenti loggati se web.require_login_for_read."""
if web_cfg.get('require_login_for_read'):
emit_to_authorized('aprs_msg', data)
else:
socketio.emit('aprs_msg', data)
# Caricamento iniziale cache telemetria
if os.path.exists(CACHE_FILE):